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Book Review (pt.3): The Orthodox Church by Timothy Ware: Orthodox Theology
The following is part 3 of my book review of Ware’s The Orthodox Church. Here I focus on Orthodox Theology. Click here for the full review in PDF, or here for the full review in podcast format.
Ware, Timothy. The Orthodox Church, 3rd Edition. New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1993. 359 pp.
The Trinity
As one might expect given the centrality of The Creed in Orthodox life, the foundation of Orthodox theology is the doctrine of the Trinity. The theological definitions of Nicaea are not simply for high theologians or scholars, but have practical import for every Christian. “Our private lives, our personal relations, and all our plans of forming a Christian society depend upon a right theology of the Trinity” (208). To say God is Trinity is to say God is personal, “a perpetual movement of love” (209). Although it is an Orthodox maxim that “all true theology is mystical,” and although Eastern theology is much more apophatic than Western theology, the definitional creeds demonstrate that the “way of negation” must always be a counterpart to the “way of affirmation,” or cataphatic theology (205, 209).
The Orthodox have developed an essential distinction between two aspects of God in order to preserve and protect the mystery and transcendence of God as well as the immanent experiential dimension of God: the essence-energies distinction. God’s essence is unknowable, but his energies are ever-present in the created world. As John of Damascus put it: “That there is a God is clear; but what He is by essence and nature, this is altogether beyond our comprehension and knowledge” (209). On the other hand, God exists within creation and is “everywhere present and filling all things,” permeating the universe and “intervening directly in concrete situations” (209). God’s essence and energies are different dynamics of God himself: two sides of the same being of God. Therefore, God’s energies “are God himself,” and “we experience them in the form of deifying grace and divine light” (209). We are not able to ever experience the fullness of God’s essence, but only participate in his energies. “No single thing of all that is created has or ever will have even the slightest communion with the supreme nature or nearness to it” (209). However, in the incarnation, God has surpassed merely being present in the form of his energies; he has come to the human race as a person. “A closer union than this between God and His creation there could not be” (210).
Ware does a good job explaining why the Orthodox think the Filioque is heretical or at least dangerous. It undermines the monarchy of the Father, and therefore the distinctness of the persons of the Trinity. According to early Christian doctrine, the Father is the monarch of the Trinity—he is the only person in the Trinity whose origin is “solely in Himself and not in any other person” (211). The Orthodox uphold the monarchy of the Father as essential to Trinitarian doctrine. This is what makes him “Father.” The Son and the Spirit have their eternal being from the Father. The Son is eternally begotten from the Father and the Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father. The “Double-Procession” doctrine of the West obscures this truth, for it has the Holy Spirit proceeding also from the Son. Yet this tension is apparently reconcilable if one conceives of this procession in this way: “the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son,” for then the Father is still the source (or as the East might say, then the Father is still the Father). Even then, however, the Father must be understood to be the eternal source of the Holy Spirit, and the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Son must be seen as a temporal mission. Undermining the distinctions of persons in the Trinity and what makes each person unique leads inevitably to de-personalizing the doctrine of the Trinity and falling into ditheism or semi-Sabellianism (213).
The Orthodox “hawks” follow the polemical spirit of Photius and consider the Filioque heresy, whereas the Orthodox “doves” advocate “a more lenient approach to the question” that focuses more on how the language of the Filioque is understood than on the phrase itself. For the latter group, the Filioque is still “potentially misleading” and a “confused phrase” (213). Ware suggests that the West has a tendency to overemphasize the unity of the Trinity and points to Aquinas as the example of how Western conceptions of the Trinity tend to depersonalize the Trinity. According to Ware, Aquinas “went so far as to identify the persons with the relations: personae sunt ipsae relations,” which appears to turn God “into an abstract idea” (215). The “hawks” think that the Filioque has caused the West to subordinate the Spirit to the Son—“if not in theory, then at any rate in practice” (215).
Anthropology
That we are made in the image and likeness of God must be understood primarily in terms of the Trinity. In the Greek Fathers “image” and “likeness” are not mere synonyms. Image refers to man as an icon of God: man’s free will, reason, and sense of moral responsibility. “Likeness” on the other hand, refers to moral likeness and “depends” on each individuals moral choice and human effort (219). To become more and more like God is to become more and more deified or “assimilated to God through virtue” (219). The deified person has become a “second god” or “a god by grace” (219). As the Scripture says: “You are gods, and all of you sons of the Most High” (Psalm 82:6). Disease and death are a result of human sin. The human will is weakened and enfeebled by what Greeks call “desire” (Western theologians call this “concupiscence”), but humanity is not thereby entirely “deprived” of God’s grace. Rather, after the fall grace works on the human from “outside” rather than from the “inside” (223). The Orthodox disagree with Augustine’s belief that after the fall humans loose their “freedom” and sin by a necessity due to a “sin nature” (223). To Orthodox, this would seem to contradict human free-will and deny humanity of the “image” of God. Furthermore, babies do not inherit the “guilt” of Adam, only his mortality and corruption. Guilt is not inherited, but humans are guilty inasmuch as they imitate Adam (224).
The Incarnation
Whereas the West tends to view the incarnation as necessary only because of The Fall, Orthodoxy believes that the incarnation is the logical outworking of God’s philanthropia: his loving desire to be united with humanity. God would still have become incarnate even if there was no fall of the human race into sin. Ware also wants to cast doubt on the common “assertion that the East concentrates on the Risen Christ, the West on Christ crucified” (227). Ware believes that “representations of the Crucifixion are no less prominent in Orthodox than in non-Orthodox churches,” but the Orthodox do not separate the glory of Christ from his crucifixion and tend to hold in contrast “His outward humiliation and His inward glory” (226-27). Even the crucified Christ is “Christ the Victor” (228). “The western worshipper, when he meditates upon the Cross, is encouraged all to often to feel an emotional sympathy with the Man of Sorrows, rather than to adore the victorious and triumphant king” (228).
The Holy Spirit
Whereas Western theology tends to have an inexcusably underdeveloped doctrine of the Holy Spirit, Eastern theology “lays great stress upon the work of the Holy Spirit” (230). In a sense, the Eastern theologians consider the sending of the Holy Spirit as the ultimate aim of the incarnation, and the entire Christian life is “nothing else than the acquisition of the Holy Spirit” (230). This acquisition is a human participation in God; it is deification; it is theosis; it is salvation; it is redemption. Christians are called to “participate in the divine nature” according to 2 Peter 1:4. “The human being does not become God by nature, but is merely a ‘created god,’ a god by grace or by status” (232). Practically speaking, this takes place to the degree that the human will is conformed to the philanthropic will of God; it takes place to the degree that the human will loves God and others (232). Our “full deification,” however, will take place at the Resurrection when our bodies too will become “deified” as the glorified body of Christ (233). The two-dimensional icons of glorified saints in the Orthodox Church depict this final glorification, and remind Orthodox Christians of the redemption of all creation (234). The Orthodox belief in cosmic redemption is what fuels their “increasing concern about the pollution of the environment” (235). The maxim of St. Silouan of Mount Athos sums this concern up this way: “The heart that has learnt to love has pity for all creation” (235).
Ware suggests six points of clarification necessary for not misunderstanding the doctrine of deification.
1. Deification is not for certain Christians, but all Christians.
2. Deification presupposes a continual repentance (and therefore the presence of sin)
3. The methods for deification are not eccentric:
a. Go to church
b. Receive the sacraments regularly
c. Pray to God in “spirit and truth”
d. Read the Gospels
e. Follow the commandments
4. Deification is a “social process” for it involves loving one’s neighbor.
5. Love for God and neighbor must “issue in action.”
6. Deification presupposes the life of the church.
The Church
There are many similarities between Orthodox ecclesiology and Catholic ecclesiology. Orthodoxy insists on hierarchical structure, Apostolic succession, the episcopate, the priesthood, prayer to the saints and intercession for “the departed” (239). However, whereas the Catholic church believes in papal infallibility, the Orthodox “stress the infallibility of the Church as a whole” (239). Ware also adds that “to the Orthodox it often seems like Rome envisages the Church too much in terms of earthly power and organization” (239). Orthodox ecclesiology, while having “many strict and minute rules, as anyone who reads the Canons can quickly discover,” nevertheless is more mystical and thinks of the church more in terms of its relationship to God (240).
Ware summarizes the Orthodox doctrine of the church in three major points. The Church is 1) the Image of the Holy Trinity, 2) the Body of Christ, and 3) a continued Pentecost (240).
1) That the church is an “image” of the Trinity means at least two things. First, this is because the church consists of many persons united in one, yet each retaining their own unique personhood. Second, this also means that just as in the Trinity all three persons are equal, “so in the Church no one bishop can claim to wield an absolute power over all the rest; yet, just as in the Trinity the Father enjoys pre-eminence as source and fountainhead of the deity, so within the Church the Pope is ‘first among equals’” (241).
2) That the church is “the body of Christ,” means “the church is the extension of the Incarnation, the place where the incarnation perpetuates itself” (241). The Church is the “organ” of Christ’s redeeming work, prophetic utterance, priestly ministry, and kingly power (241). Christ has promised his “perpetual presence” in the Church. In Orthodox ecclesiology, this is especially the case in the sacraments. The Church exists “in its fullness” wherever the Eucharist is celebrated (242). “The Church must be thought of primarily in sacramental terms,” that is, “it’s outward organization, however important, is secondary to its sacramental life” (242).
3) The Church is a continual Pentecost because the Spirit continues to give himself to the Church. Irenaeus wrote “where the Church is, there is the Spirit, and where the Spirit is, there is the Church” (242). The gift of the Spirit is given to the church, but also “appropriated by each in her or his own way,” making the gift of the Holy Spirit very personal (242). The Church is therefore a place of diversity and variety, yet a precisely because it is the dwelling place of the Holy Spirit, it is also unified. The Church is the true Holy University (my words, not Ware’s)—united by the Holy Spirit, yet diversely gifted by the Holy Spirit.
This Church is also both invisible and visible, divine and human. It is invisible because it includes all the saints of history and the angels. It is visible because it consists of specific congregations worshipping on earth. It is human and its members are sinners; yet it is divine for it is the Body of Christ (243). While the West has grown accustomed to distinguishing between the visible and invisible church, the Orthodox does not separate these two, “for the two make up a single and continuous reality” (243). The visible church and the invisible church are the very same church. Finally, in Orthodox theology, one can say that individual members of the Church are sinners, but one cannot therefore say that The Church sins, for it is the sinless Body of Christ.
Human sin cannot affect the essential nature of the Church. We must not say that because Christians on earth sin and are imperfect, therefore the Church sins and is imperfect; for the Church, even on earth, is a thing of heaven, and cannot sin. … St. Ephraim of Syria rightly spoke … ‘The mystery of the Church consists in the very fact that together sinners become something different from what they are as individuals; this ‘something different’ is the Body of Christ.’ (244).
The Orthodox believe that the unity of the Church “follows of necessity from the unity of God” (245). “There is only one Christ, and so there can be only one Body of Christ. Nor is this unity merely ideal and invisible” because, as we have seen, for the Orthodox the visible and invisible church are the same church. The “undivided church” is not something that existed only at the early stages of Christianity and something we hope to attain in the future. It is a present reality in the here and now. On earth, it exists in a “visible community” (245). Therefore, the Orthodox Church admits of no schism within the church, only schisms from the Church.
For Catholicism, the Pope is the “unifying principle” of the Church, but for Orthodoxy, the unifying principle is sacramental communion (246). “The act of communion therefore forms the criterion for membership of the Church” (246). In case the reader has not figured it out by this point, Ware explicitly spells out the implication of this aspect of Orthodox ecclesiology: “Orthodoxy, believing that the Church on earth has remained and must remain visibly one, naturally also believes itself to be that one visible Church” (246). The Orthodox Church, according to Orthodox ecclesiology, is not just the “real” Church or the “right” church—it’s the only Church. Ware speaks with a tone of disapproval for Orthodox theologians who “sometimes speak as if they accepted the ‘Branch Theory’” that allows for different branches of the Church (e.g. Catholic, Anglican, Eastern Orthodox, etc.). Therefore, it is visibly one and there are no divisions within the Church. Ware’s comment that this will probably seem a bit “arrogant” is a humorous and delicate understatement.
Nor is this all. “Orthodoxy also teaches that outside the Church there is no salvation (Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus). For Orthodoxy this statement is redundant; a tautology. Ware explains: “Outside the Church there is no salvation, because salvation is the Church” (247). Does this mean Catholics and Protestants are outside salvation? Ware answers this question as if the answer were obvious, but he gives a surprising answer: “Of course not” (247). This takes some careful explaining:
As Augustine wisely remarked, “How many sheep there are without, how many wolves within!” While there is no division between a “visible” and an “indivisible Church,” yet there may be members of the Church who are not visibly such, but whose membership is known to God alone. If anyone is saved, he must in some sense be a member of the Church; in what sense, we cannot always say.
But Ware’s attempt to explain his surprising answer does not resolve the obvious tension. If the Orthodox Church is the only church, and the unity of the Church is visible, then the question of how one can be considered a member of the Orthodox Church who does not belong to this visible Church (i.e. those who do not have sacramental communion in an Orthodox Church) is indeed a grand mystery. Furthermore, whoever the Orthodox think these secret members of the Church are, they must certainly not be Catholics or Protestants, for the Orthodox believe that if they alone convened a general council (excluding Catholics and Protestants), it would be a true Ecumenical Council with the same authority of the first seven Councils.
Book Review (pt. 2): The Orthodox Church by Timothy Ware: Orthodox Tradition
The following is part 2 in my Book Review of:
Ware, Timothy (Bishop Kallistos of Diokleia). The Orthodox Church, 3rd Edition. New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1993. 359 pp.
For the whole review, you can click here for the PDF version, or go here for the podcast audio version.
Orthodox Tradition
The Orthodox accept all ecumenical councils as “infallible” and desire to protect primitive beliefs and practices of the church. However, only the first seven major councils are considered truly “ecumenical.” Although Catholics went on to have more councils the Catholic Tradition would consider “ecumenical,” the Orthodox do not recognize them as ecumenical at all, and therefore do not recognize them as authoritative.
The Orthodox often consider the “apparent changelessness” of the Orthodox Church as one of its distinct characteristics: its “air of antiquity” and faithful continuation of the ancient practices of the church (195). According to Ware, this is also partly why some of the Orthodox fall into an “extreme conservatism” and fail to distinguish between Tradition and traditions (198). The “outward forms” that express the Orthodox Tradition include the Bible, the seven ecumenical councils (the Creed), later councils, The Fathers, the Liturgy, Canon Law, and Icons.
The Bible is honored and venerated as authoritative within the Orthodox Church, but not over the Orthodox Church. Within the Orthodox Church, Scripture is considered God’s supreme revelation (199). Therefore, its teaching has authority. However, “it is from the Church that the Bible ultimately derives its authority, for it was the Church which originally decided which books form a part of Holy Scripture” (199, italics added). Individual readers will inevitably interpret the Bible as they read it, but individual interpreters will always be “in danger of error” if they do not accept the authoritative guidance of the larger Orthodox Church. Unless an individual’s interpretation is accepted by the broader church, it is not authoritative. In this way, “it is the Church alone which can interpret Holy Scripture with authority” (199). Furthermore, the Orthodox Church does not dichotomize Scripture and Tradition, for they see Scripture as itself a part of Tradition.
It would be an understatement to say that Orthodox biblical interpretation is heavily influenced by the readings of the Septuagint: the Septuagint translation is considered “inspired of the Holy Spirit” and therefore constitutes God’s “continuing revelation” (200). This also means the ten additional books of the Septuagint are part of the Orthodox canon, although Ware concedes that many Orthodox scholars now consider the Deutero-Canonical Books of the Septuagint as “on a lower footing than the rest of the Old Testament” (200). Although Orthodox scholars have not enjoyed a prominent role in the critical-historical study of the Bible, Ware assures his readers that Orthodoxy “does not forbid” such study (201).
Even if all the doctrinal definitions of the seven ecumenical councils are “infallible,” the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed is the cornerstone of all the creeds, surpassing all subsequent creeds in its importance (202). Orthodox theology is also heavily influenced by subsequent definitions of certain local councils and letters or statements of faith written by certain influential bishops. Ware conveniently lists the most important of these, sometimes called the “Symbolical Books” (203).
While the theology of the Fathers produced the first seven ecumenical councils, “as with local councils, so with the Fathers, the judgment of the Church is selective” and “Patristic wheat needs to be distinguished from Patristic chaff” (204). The Orthodox do, however, see a consistency of mind in the Fathers. This they call the “Patristic mind” (204). Although there is a particular reverence for writers of the early church—especially the fourth century Fathers—“the Orthodox Church has never attempted to define exactly who the Fathers are,” so Ware is optimistic that unless God has “deserted the church,” more Fathers will come (204). The most recent “Father” mentioned by Ware, however, was the fourteenth century Saint: Mark of Ephesus (the one who refused to sign the Florentine Union document).
Ware claims that “other parts of Tradition do not have quite the same authority” as Scripture, the Creed and the Ecumenical Councils (197). When speaking of the Liturgy, however, he emphasizes that certain doctrines that the Orthodox express in their worship can be “just as binding as an explicit formulation,” even thought they have never been defined or proclaimed as dogma by Orthodoxy (197, 204). The maxim Lex orandi lex credendi [our faith is expressed in our prayer] is particularly applicable here. Orthodoxy has made very few dogmatic statements, for example, about “the Eucharist and the other Sacraments, about the next world, the Mother of God, the saints, and the faithful departed,” even though their services and the Liturgy reflect these beliefs (205).
Protestants often appreciate the theological definitions of the early councils, but Orthodox take the ecclesiastical declarations with a similar seriousness. Declarations of the ecumenical councils dealing with Church organization and governance are called canons. Certain writers compiled these canons, along with other local canons, and wrote explanations and commentaries. Today, the commentary of St. Nicodemus of the Holy Mountain (1800) known as the Pedalion [“Rudder”] is the standard Greek commentary on canon law. Although much of this ancient canon law is outdated and out of use, if and when a new general council of the Orthodox meets (which so many Orthodox despair will never happen), Ware hopes they will “revise” and “clarify” (read: update) Canon Law (205).
The Orthodox Church’s devotion to the veneration of two-dimensional icons is perhaps one of her most striking features. The Orthodox consider them as means to attain to “a vision of the spiritual world” (206). God can be revealed through art, yet because the Holy Icons are an expression of Tradition, “icon painters are not free to adapt or innovate as they please” but only within the limitations of “certain prescribed rules” (206). Their art cannot be a mere reflection of the artists ascetic sentiments but “must reflect the mind of the church” (206).
Audio Book Review: The Orthodox Church by Timothy Ware
Here is part 1 and 2 of the audio version of my book review of The Orthodox Church by Timothy Ware. You will find that on part 1 the audio volume fluctuates. This was because I accidently had my condenser microphone on a special auto setting. You can still listen and enjoy, but you may find yourself having to adjust the volume at different parts of the review.
Ware, Timothy (Bishop Kallistos of Diokleia). The Orthodox Church, 3rd Editition. New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1993. 359pp.
Part 1: Introduction and History of the Orthodox Church
Part 2: Orthodox Tradition and Theology; Criticism and Conclusion
Book Review: The Orthodox Church by Timothy Ware; Orthodox History
So many western Christians are ignorant about Eastern Christianity and The Orthodox Church. It’s not that we consciously snub our noses at Eastern Christianity; it’s that we virtually ignore them altogether. Our historical theology books almost pretend they don’t exist. We summarize the different theological views in Christianity by making reference to Protestants and Catholics, but rarely ever Eastern Orthodoxy. I might have guessed that after getting a Bachelors of Religion and a Masters of Divinity, I might know a bit about viewpoints of Eastern Christians. Instead, my own ignorance has led me to search it out. For the next several months, I will be posting almost exclusively about Eastern Orthodoxy, starting with a 4-part book summary/review of Timothy Ware’s introductory book on The Orthodox Church. I have also provided audio and PDF versions of this book summary/review for those interested in reading or listening through. My summary/review will cover Orthodox history, tradition, and theology, ending with my own criticism and conclusion on Ware’s book. Enjoy.
Book Review: The Orthodox Church by Timothy Ware (here is the whole review in PDF)
Ware, Timothy (Bishop Kallistos of Diokleia). The Orthodox Church, 3rd Edition. New York, New York: Penguin Books, 1993. 359 pp.
Born in England and converted from Anglicanism to the Orthodox faith at the age of 24, Timothy Ware became Kallistos Ware upon his entrance to the priesthood in 1966, the same year he began lecturing at Oxford on Eastern Orthodox Studies. Although Ware has become a well received historian in Orthodox studies, he is no mere academician. Since 1982, Kallistos has assisted the Ecumenical Patriarch himself, acting as metropolitan Kallistos over the archdiocese of Thyateira and Great Britan under the title Bishop of Diokleia. Furthermore, he has traveled throughout Greece and therefore is familiar with the monastic life of the East (e.g. Mt Athos and the monastery of St. John at Patmos).
Having been educated in the West, Ware’s historical and theological overview of Orthodoxy has become a widely used introduction to Orthodox Christianity in Western schools and is written with western sensitivities in mind. This makes his book an excellent starting point for the exploration of Orthodoxy for Christians in the West. The first part of Ware’s treatment covers the history of the Orthodox Church, while part two takes up various theological themes and also looks at the worship of the Orthodox Church. With unprecedented ecumenical interests in the West still active, Ware’s book is still an indispensible resource. Because Christians in the West are largely unfamiliar with Orthodoxy, rather than a mere book review, I have sought to make available a significant portion of the book’s content while giving only brief attention to criticism.
:: Orthodox History ::
Early Christianity
The history of the Orthodox Church starts at the same time and place that the history of the Catholic Church begins. Both Catholic and Orthodox tradition share in common many of the early figures of Christianity. For example, St. Ignatius, the Bishop of Antioch who wrote seven short letters on his way to Rome to be martyred, emphasized both a hierarchical and sacramental church, calling the Eucharist “the medicine of immortality” (13). Catholics and Orthodox alike have canonized St. Ignatius and have adopted many of his teachings. The same could be said of St. Cyprian of Carthage and his emphasis on the unity and salvific exclusivity of the church (14).
In Ware’s estimation, the reign of Constantine, his Christianization of Constantinople, and his instigation of the Council of Nicaea “mark the Church’s coming of age” (20). Nicaea, and the six Councils that followed, did not seek to explain the mystery of how God might become man, but simply sought to draw a fence around that mystery by excluding certain misunderstandings (20). These councils were not overly abstract and theoretical, Ware assures us, but were concerned with the message of human salvation (20). The reader is reminded by the author that the doctrine of theosis (deification)—a doctrine having centrality only in Orthodox soteriology—was taught by St. Athanasius, a champion of Trinitarian Orthodoxy during this critical period of doctrinal development in the church. It was Athanasius who proclaimed: “God became human that we might be made god” (21).
Protestants who tend to focus only on the theological declarations of the early Councils should notice Ware’s attention to the Council’s ecclesiastical declarations—all of which assumed a hierarchical structure of church government and singled out certain places for special honor in ecclesiastical affairs, i.e. the Pentarchy: Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem (22-23, 26-28). From an Orthodox perspective, Rome’s mistake was to go beyond her place of pastoral primacy in the Pentarchy (“the first among equals”) and assume for herself supreme power and jurisdiction (27-28). It was also during the period Ware designates as “The Church of the Seven Councils” that Iconodulism was vindicated in what is now celebrated as “The Triumph of Orthodoxy” in 843 C.E. (31). Veneration of icons was not merely absolved from charges of idolatry or condoned as tolerable. Rather, the veneration of icons was (and still is) seen as a necessary safeguard for a full and proper doctrine of the incarnation (33). “The Iconoclast controversy,” Ware concludes, “is thus closely linked to the earlier disputes about Christ’s person. … about human salvation” (33).
Schisms and Attempts at Reunion
Rather than writing off the non-Chalcedonian Christians as mere heretics, Western historians will notice that Ware calls them “Oriental Orthodox Churches,” and he counts their alienation from Chalcedonian Christians as the first major historic division within Christendom, the second being The Great Schism of 1054 between East and West, and the third being the Protestant Schism of the sixteenth century (4). While Western historians have conveniently dated the Great Schism between East and West as beginning in 1054, Ware is quick to point out that starting in 1009 the Western popes were no longer included in the Diptychs (the Constantinopolitan Patriarch’s lists of other legitimate patriarchs). It does not appear coincidental that this is also the same year Pope Sergius IV is thought to have written a letter to the patriarch of Constantinople including the Filioque. Since this sort of omission of the Pope’s name from the Dyptychs is probably “tantamount to a declaration that one is not in communion with [the patriarch of Constantinople],” Ware considers this to be the real (or “technical”) date for the Great Schism (57).
Ware urges that this religious schism must also be seen in light of a larger context, for it takes place within a schism of Eastern and Western civilizations that unfortunately alienated Eastern and Western Christians (46). Although the schism was due to different developments in Eastern and Western theology and practice (e.g. different theological emphases, different styles of church government, different worship practices), Ware blames the instigation of the schism on a theologian of Charlemagne’s court who accused Eastern Christians of being “heretics” for not accepting the Filioque (51). The East had no choice but to respond. As if it was not enough that the Eastern Christians considered the Filioque heresy, tampering with the universal Creed without a universal council was considered a sin against the unity of the church. Even Pope Leo III himself, in his letter to Charlemagne, strongly objected to tampering with the Nicene-Constantinopolitan creed by adding the Filioque without an Ecumenical Council (51).
It was this tampering with the creed without ecumenical consultation, along with the papal claims of universal jurisdiction, that ultimately caused the irreconcilable differences that led to the incidents that culminated in the mutual anathemas of 1054. Exacerbating this formal schism, Crusaders began setting up Latin Patriarchs in the East. This localized the schism in new ways for ordinary Christians in the East previously unconcerned with the disputes between the pope and the patriarch of Constantinople (59). This brought the schism down to the popular level. The infamous forth crusade (1204) would further seal in blood the contentious divisions between Eastern and Western Christendom. Ware’s understanding of culpability for the schism, however, is not entirely one sided. He concedes that the East also shares responsibility for fueling the schism. For example, in the riot of 1182, “many Latin residents at Constantinople were massacred by the Byzantine populace” (61). Ware concludes that the schism was, for both sides, “a great tragedy” (61).
The first attempt at reunion with the West, The Council of Lyons in 1274, came during the restored Byzantine Empire under the auspices of Emperor Michael VIII (reigned 1259-82). But this attempt was—to a significant extent at least—motivated by political factors. Emperor Michael wanted the protection of the pope against the attacks of the Sicilian ruler Charles of Anjou, and ecclesial union was the best way to ensure this help (61-62).
The second attempt at reunion—the Florentine Union (meted out at the Council of Florence, 1438-39)—was accomplished in hopes of military support from the West and thus also largely motivated by political interests. Although its results were more impressive, this council ultimately suffered a similar fate as the Council of Lyons. In an official document, the Orthodox accepted the Papal claims, the Double Procession of the Holy Spirit, and the Roman teaching on purgatory (71). Only one member of the Orthodox party was unable to sign his name to the formula: Mark, Archbishop of Ephesus. Furthermore, both John VIII and Constantine XI (the last two emperors of Byzantium) held fast to the union.
The Union was proclaimed publicly at Constantinople in 1452, one year before the Turks began their sack of Constantinople. According to Ware, however, not only were the overwhelming majority of Orthodox clergy and people deeply against the Union, many signatories quickly recanted. The responses of the Orthodox faithful were unmistakable. When Isidore, for example, proclaimed the decrees of Florence to Moscow in 1441 he was thrown into prison by the Grand Duke (103). Orthodox people came to think that the Turkish success in their sack of Constantinople was God’s punishment for the heresy of the Florence Union where Byzantine leaders “betrayed the faith” (103-11). As for the Archbishop Mark, he was forever canonized as a saint by the Orthodox Church (71).
More recent attempts at unity have looked very different. Patriarch Athenagoras (in office 1948-72) made “the promotion of world-wide Christian unity” one of his main tasks, one for which he was “attacked by more conservative Orthodox in Greece and elsewhere” (129). His successor, Patriarch Dimitrios (in office 1972-91), however, continued to pursue to same agenda. Today, the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew (elected 1991) “maintains close links with Western Christians” (129). It would seem, then, that a legacy of ecumenism now exists in the Eastern Orthodox tradition.
The Spread of Orthodoxy
Although The Orthodox Church is often accused of not being missionary minded, Ware is concerned to show that Orthodoxy has a strong tradition of missionary outreach. In his chapter entitled “The Conversion of the Slavs,” he explores the explosive missionary activity of the ninth century. The missionary work to the Slavs began to take place on a large scale with Patriarch Photius who sent two Greek brothers among the Slavs (Constantine/Cyril and Methodius) who became known as “The Apostles to the Slavs” (73). Ware unfavorably compares Rome’s insistence on a Latin mass to the missionary practice of the East. “The Orthodox Church,” Ware exclaims, “has never been rigid in the matter of languages; its normal policy is to hold services in the language of the people” (74). Although the work of these apostles seemed at first to have ended in failure, Ware considers the conversion of Bulgaria, Serbia, and Russia, to be the result of their missionary labors (75).
Eastern Orthodoxy especially flourished in Russia, initially in Keiv (before the Mongol invasions brought Kievan Russia to a “sudden and violent end”) but centering eventually in Muscovy. When Ivan III “The Great” (reigned 1462-1505) married the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor (Constantine XI), he established a link with Byzantium and began assuming the titles of “autocrat” and “Tsar” (an Eastern adaption of the Roman “Caesar”). The period from 1350 to 1550 Ware considers to be “the golden age in Russian spirituality” and religious art (86). People began to think of Moscow as “the third Rome,” the new center of Orthodox Christendom.
Ware warns, however, that some depictions and impressions of “Holy Russia” from this period place “too much emphasis on externals” (110). Nikon the Reformer (1605-81) would later aim to conform Russian Orthodoxy to ancient Greek practices of worship. He not only persecuted all opposition to his reforms, but also tried to make the Church supreme over the State (113). This went beyond the Byzantium notion of dyarchy (or symphony) between the sacerdotium and imperium, each supreme in its own sphere, and placed the Patriarch’s authority over the authority of the Tsar. Because the church had come to be controlled more and more by the state, Nikon wanted to reverse the situation and intervene in civil affairs—even taking on the title “Great Lord” (previously reserved only for the Tsar).
A Council held at Moscow (1666-67) decided in favor of Nikon’s worship reforms but against his political reform, reasserting the Byzantine doctrine of dyarchy (113). Ware believes this attempt at political supremacy ultimately caused future Tsars to suppress the office of Patriarch, for soon Peter the Great (1682-1725) would issue the Spiritual Regulation of 1721. This Regulation abolished the office of Patriarch altogether and replaced it with “The Spiritual College” or “The Holy Synod” (114). Even then, however, the church was not allowed to choose the members of this Holy Synod. This authority now belonged to the Tsar alone, along with the title “Supreme Judge of the Spiritual College” (114). There are many interesting parallels here with the history of the papacy in the West with its long chronicles of tug-of-war between ecclesiastical and secular politics.
Orthodoxy Under Persecution
Because the Orthodox are so unified in their doctrinal commitments, rather than dividing Eastern Orthodoxy according to various strands of theological camps, Ware helpfully divides the Orthodox according to social location: 1) those living in a dominantly Muslim culture, 2) those still living in the Church-State alliance of the Byzantine type, 3) those who were (until “recently”) living under Communist rule, 4) those living in the West that comprise what Ware calls “the diaspora,” made up of immigrants and converts (a significant portion of which dwell in North America), and 5) those in various missionary movements in places like East Africa, Japan, China, and Korea. Category three (those recovering from Communist control) are “by far the largest of the five groups, comprising as it does the Churches of Russia, Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Georgia, Poland, Albania and Czechoslovakia, and amounting to over 85 per cent of the total membership of the Orthodox Church today” (126).
Persecution is a common theme in Orthodox history. Since the expansion of Islam, Orthodoxy was not allowed to flourish freely under Muslim rule. This is still true today. For example, in the “anti-Greek” and “anti-Christian” riot of 1955, “sixty out of the eighty Orthodox churches in the city [Istanbul] were sacked or gutted and incalculable damage was done to Christian property, with widespread raping and loss of life” (128). The Patriarchate’s printing press was shut down in the 1960s by Turkish authorities. The theological school of Halki near Istanbul was forced to shut down in 1971. “By the early 1990s the Greek community had dwindled to a mere three or four thousand, mostly elderly and poor” (128).
The history of Orthodoxy under Communist rule is also grim. The beacon of Orthodoxy—Russia—experienced intense persecution during the 20th century. The basic attitude of Communist authorities during this century was hostile to Christianity (along with any other religious belief). This is because, as Ware explains the state of affairs, “Soviet Communism was committed by its fundamental principles to an aggressive and militant atheism” (145). After the Bolsheviks came to power, in Ware’s words, “The Church ceased to possess any rights; quite simply, it was not a legal entity” (146). For example, the Church was excluded from all participation in the education system. Ware gives a shocking example of an injunction given to teachers during this period:
A Soviet teacher must be guided by the principle of the Party spirit of science; he is obliged not only to be an unbeliever himself, but also to be an active propagandist of godlessness among others, to be the bearer of the ideas of militant proletarian atheism. Skilfully [sic] and calmly, tactfully and persistently, the Soviet teacher must expose and overcome religious prejudices in the course of his activity in school and out of school, day in and day out. (147)
Article 13 of the “Law on Religious Associations” (enacted in 1929) granted only “freedom of religious belief and of anti-religious propaganda” (146). “The totalitarian Communist State employed to the full all forms of anti-religious propaganda, while denying the Church any right of reply” (147). Furthermore, after 1943, bishops and clergy were not allowed to engage in charitable or social work. Even “sick visiting was severely restricted” (146). “Not only,” writes Ware, “were churches closed on a massive scale in the 1920s and 1930s, but huge numbers of bishops and clergy, monks, nuns and laity were sent to prison and to concentration camps. How many were executed or died from ill-treatment we simply cannot calculate” (148, italics added).
Tikhon, the Patriarch of Moscow, anathematized the “the godless rulers of the darkness of our time,” but was thrown into prison by the Communist regime for his outspoken resistance. “What pressures St. Tikhon underwent in custody we do not know,” but by the time of his release his antagonist tone had become more conciliatory. He died later under “mysterious circumstances” (151). Patriarch Sergius—head of the Russian Orthodox Church under the title locum tenens from 1925 to 1943 and Patriarch from 1943 until his death in 1944—would later attempt to segregate political loyalty from ecclesiastical loyalty, arguing that one could be both a Christian and a supporter of the State and demanding a “written promise of complete loyalty to the Soviet government” (152). The “exiled Synod,” however, labeled this “Sergianism” and condemned it as “capitulation of the Church to the atheist government” (153). Others, however, supported the policy of Sergius and “felt that he was sincerely seeking to protect the Church” and taking upon himself the “martyrdom of lying” to save the Church from destruction (154). “Members of the Russian Orthodox Church remain to this day deeply divided in their estimate of Sergius’ conduct” (154).
Over time, political leaders—such as Stalin—eventually realized it was in their best interest to make concessions to the church in order to have the full support of the people for war (155). In 1943, Stalin summoned Sergius and two other metropolitans into his presence and allowed them to elect a new Patriarch. After the war, Stalin also permitted a major reconstruction of the Church. Ware warns the reader, however, not to jump to the conclusion that this was a vindication of Sergius’s policy. According to Ware, this change in the churches fortunes was “a historical accident – the war” (156). Furthermore, Stalin’s toleration was limited; the State still combated the church through propaganda, disallowing a response; the State still forbade the Church to do charitable social work or youth work; the State still forbade the “religious” education of children, etc.
Perhaps most importantly, the State expected the church leaders to be loyal to the State and squelch the Orthodox dissidents who openly protested against the State’s intervention with church affairs. The Open Letter written in 1965 by two Moscow priests from this movement (Fr Nicolas Eshliman and Fr Gleb Yakunin) addressed to Patriarch Alexis “mentioned in detail the repressive measures taken against the Church by the Communist authorities and the lack of resistance, even the apparent co-operation, of the Church authorities,” and urgently called the Patriarch to act (158). “Sadly, yet perhaps predictably, the Patriarch’s only response was to suspend the two priests from their ministry” (158). Other dissidents were “sent to labour camps and exile” and the KGB discredited many of them in various ways (159). “By 1980 most of the leading Orthodox members had been silenced” (159). The Bolshevik Revolution was the single most important historical event that was a catalyst for the spread of Orthodoxy in the Western world, for it “drove into exile more than a million Russians, including the cultural and intellectual élite of the nation” (173). A significant portion of the Orthodox faithful are now North America, consisting not only of immigrants, but converts. The Orthodox Church in America (OCA), according to the more generous estimates, has over one million members.
When the Communist regime fell in 1992 and the Church in Russia began her slow liberation, she faced shocking costs of repairs, a gaping need for the supply of religious literature, lack of training in social work or religious teaching. They had to “start from nothing” (163). Furthermore, the Church now faced a pluralistic society—there was now true separation between Church and state. Athiesm was no longer the State’s “religion,” but neither was Orthodoxy. Protestant and Catholic missionaries are now free to carry out missionary work in Russia and the Orthodox Church has no power to stop it (163). “Russian Orthodoxy under Communism was in a paradoxical way still to some extent a ‘State Church’, protected by the authorities as well as persecuted. Now this is no longer so.” (163). The power of the state can no longer be used to suppress heretical movements of pretenders to Orthodoxy. There has also been a fragmentation of ecclesial structures in Orthodoxy (174). Perhaps the most crippling impairment, however, to the Orthodox Church in Russia in the post-Communist era, is her tarnished moral authority (163). “With the opening up of the KGB files in 1992, many of the laity have been scandalized to discover the extent of the collaboration under Communism between certain bishops and the secret police” (164).
7 Most Viewed__T h e o • p h i l o g u e__Posts
Of all the things I post about on my blog, it always surprises me which posts get the most hits. Here are my 7 most popular posts to date:
1. Ancient Persian Imperial History :: pt. 2 :: The Empires Peak — This was just part 2 (of 4) in a series I did on the ancient Persian Empire. I was shocked when I began to realize that more people were interested in my concise summary of this history than any of my other posts.
2. Psychology is the Devil: A Critique of Jay Adams’ Counseling Paradigm — My very brief criticism and critique of Jay Adams’ book Competent to Counsel, along with a bit of criticism about the Biblical Counseling Movement he influenced. I don’t know why this post became such a popular post either.
3. The Sacrament of Baptism in Roman Catholic Theology — Here I simply summarized the Catholic view of Baptism using the Catholic Catechism and offered my friendly Protestant critique.
4. Charlemagne & the Carolingian Renaissance — The entire history of Charlemagne and his legacy in four short paragraphs.
5. What Martin Luther Really Said — In this post, I correct a certain misunderstanding of Luther’s doctrine of justification by offering quotations from Luther that show that Luther’s doctrine of sola fide is not what most Protestants think it is.
6. Extra-biblical Evidence for King David — I read a book written by a secular historian who thinks King David was a brutal tyrant. Yet his introductory chapter deals with evidence for King David, and the author thinks many historians are being unreasonable in their skepticism about the existence of the Davidic Kingdom. I couldn’t believe what I read.
7. Book Review: Jesus of Nazareth by Pope Benedict XVI — My review of the current Pope’s book about Jesus. This review is not easy reading, for I critically analyze Pope Ratzinger’s theological methodology, not the substance of the book as a whole. I use the Pope’s own explanation of an ideal methodology (taken from an article written long before he was pope) to judge whether or not the Pope is faithful to his own methodological proposal.
Explaining Certain Biblical Proverbs :: A Hermeneutical Experiment
Knowing that the proverbs are not intended as absolutes but relative observational/experiential “wisdom,” the following is a snapshot of my naked and knee-jerk western, Christian interpretation of the proverbs I read in the Bible. I have done this without the aid of study tools, and would be gladly corrected by those who have read informed and scholarly commentary or understand the Proverbs differently. Without such aids, however, this is my hermeneutical tendency. NOTE: I would also gladly agree that for anything touching on righteousness, Christ is intended as the “ultimate fulfillment” of such righteousness. I have offered an example of how this might work in Proverbs 10:2.
:: PROVERBS CHAPTER 10 ::
Proverbs 10:1—“The proverbs of Solomon”
[this probably means Solomon collected these proverbs during his lifetime, not necessarily that he originated all of them]
Proverbs 10:2—“Ill gotten gains do not profit, but righteousness delivers from death.”
[this probably underscores the deleterious nature of ill gotten gains, and the deep risk they involve, while also highlighting how the lifestyle of the righteous can often be the cause of their escaping execution/capital punishment by not being caught up in scandals or dishonest activity. EXAMPLE OF HOW CHRIST MIGHT “FULFILL” THE PROVERBS: Christ would be the ultimate fulfillment of this, since his refusal to be caught up in temptations of the Devil caused him to deliver both himself and the church from the ultimate death, the second death, and has delivered them from the sting of death by accomplishing resurrection unto glory for himself and his body, the church]
Proverbs 10:7—“The memory of the righteous is blessed.”
[this means that the memory of righteous persons after their death is impressionable enough to leave a pleasant and honoring effect in the hearts of those who knew them]
Proverbs 10:9—“He who walks in integrity walks securely, but he who perverts his ways will be found out.”
[this is probably a warning to those who pursue “ill gotten gains” that they constantly risk getting caught and punished with severe consequences. NOTE: This should be enough to make those who pervert their ways naturally live in the constant anxiety of fear, NOTE: their conscience is never at peace anyway]
Proverbs 10:11—“The mouth of the righteous is a fountain of life.”
[This probably means that those who live a righteous lifestyle have the ability (to lesser and greater extents) to impart helpful wisdom and inspiration to others through their ability to speak wisdom, give advise, articulate their perspective, and encourage others to live righteously]
Proverbs 10:12—“Hatred stirs up strife, but love covers all transgressions.”
[This probably means that when a person hates another, they will find reasons to vent this anger and any small matter of conflict will become a contentious occasion. They will even find petty reasons to argue and cause conflict, and you will be walking on egg shells around them. Love works in the opposite way. When you love someone, you find reasons to excuse matters of disagreement and conflict and find ways to overcome them. You find ways to overlook or downplay their weaknesses and have a tendency to forgive their mistakes and sins against you due to your strong love of them. NOTE: Neither principle is absolute, but relative.]
Proverbs 10:19—“When there are many words, transgression is unavoidable, but he who restrains his lips is wise.”
[This probably just means that people who talk excessively usually have sinful attitudes and their abundance of words is usually owing to pride of opinion, self-absorption, or some other sinful root cause. People who are righteous choose their words carefully and often hold back their opinion and perspective out of courtesy, consideration of another’s time, desire to avoid having a unnecessary disagreement that would cause tension in a relationship, or any other number of virtuous causes or motives]
Proverbs 10:20—“The heart of the wicked is worth little.”
[This probably means that the ontological core of people whose loves are selfishly oriented (and therefore not having to do with the things of God) is not pleasing to, or valued by, God]
Proverbs 10:23—“Doing wickedness is like sport to a fool and so is wisdom to a man of understanding.”
[This means that the wicked actually practice and strive to get better at their evil endeavors, and the wise likewise practice and strive to get better at righteousness]
Proverbs 10:27—“The fear of the LORD prolongs life, but the years of the wicked will be shortened.”
[this probably means that wicked people have more destructive habits in their life, and thus, all things being equal, are more prone to death. Those who have a healthy fear of the LORD and his commands tend to have less destructive habits in their life, and thus, all things being equal, are less prone to death]
Proverbs 10:28—“The hope of the righteous is gladness, but the expectation of the wicked perishes.”
[This probably just underscores how the righteous have their hopes set on spiritual happiness in God and love of neighbor, while wicked people have their hopes set on things that will not ultimately fulfill the fullness of their spiritual core–e.g. material things, vain things, selfish things, revengeful things, etc.]
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How Academic Research Benefits Christian Ministry and Education
The following is a brief reflection on research and its benefits for a vocation in Christian ministry or Christian education, written by Bradley R. Cochran.
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Love demands some apprehension of the good that is loved. … Accordingly knowledge is the cause of love for the same reason as good is, which can be loved only if known.” – Thomas Aquinas[1]
Although I have rarely seen or heard writing described as a tool for human development, my own personal development has been greatly shaped by my own writing. This is because writing involves research, research involves reading, and words have the power of influence. It is difficult to measure how great of an impact certain writings have had on my thoughts, and therefore my actions, at various stages in my personal development. For example, when I became a Christian at the age of twenty, it was prompted—at least in great part—by the words I read in the Bible. It seems hardly controversial to note that in the history of our Western culture, the words of the Bible have profoundly changed the lives of countless people. Although not all Westerners would find this a happy situation, it would be naïve to deny that the Bible has historically had a powerful effect on Western culture, ethics, education, philosophy, politics, and therefore, people. Although the Bible is not the only collection of writings that have profoundly influenced people, it is a convenient example of how words—written words in particular—have the ability to change people.
After becoming a Christian in the Protestant tradition (where the Bible is venerated as the singularly ultimate authority for all matters of life and doctrine), I was immediately faced with the challenge of living out the teachings of scripture. For me, this began my journey into research. In my own experience, then, research began not as an academic enterprise, but as a highly personal enterprise of spiritual formation. In trying to live out my faith, I began to search the scriptures and read Christian books in order to know how to think and act as a Christian. My biblical research was, from the start, a matter of determining how to live.[2]
With the help of a mentor, the Bible, and research, I was able to satisfy most of my questions and live out my faith with a clear conscience. Therefore, although research may not always play a substantial role in personal development for everyone, such development continues to be my greatest reason for valuing research. This paper will be a brief reflection on the importance of writing and research in my own studies and in my vocational goals. Because I also have vocational aspirations to teach and also continue as an active Christian minister, I will also mention ways theological research and writing are helpful in teaching and Christian ministry. Since in many ways I see my vocational goals as depending on my own personal development, I will seek to emphasize specific ways theological research and writing are important to my personal development. I propose that the ultimate importance of research and writing in my own studies is for personal development, and this personal development turns out to be of greatest benefit to my vocational calling.
Points of Clarification About Research
Although the process of research and writing is relatively complex and involves numerous subtleties I will be unable to cover in this paper (e.g. limiting the scope of research, evaluating sources, developing an argument, etc.), there are a few key elements in the creative process that need clarification before I discuss the benefits of such research and writing. First, there is research and there is academic research. Research could be defined so broadly as to include finding a telephone number in a phone book, but this is not the kind of research I have in mind in this paper.[3] Academic research involves systematically finding sources that are most relevant to your question or research topic and reading books and articles relevant to your subject matter.
Research in an academic context is refined and has a more complex ethos and more clearly defined guidelines. If I could describe the ethos in one word, it would be objectivity. The goal of objectivity shapes the entire process.[4] For example, good research is not simply believing and regurgitating whatever you happen to read,[5] but reading broadly enough to engage different opinions that bring various evidences into view. One must have some relatively objective way of evaluating the reliability, coherency, and prejudices of a given source. Reading only sources one already agrees with is also poor research for the same reason: objectivity. If one never reads the other point of view how will they come to know whether their own views hold up against counter evidence or argumentation? Besides, this would take the fun out of research! The idea is this: the more evidence you examine, the more viewpoints you consider, the more objective your research report will be. It would be naïve, however, to think that research takes away all bias.[6] Yet the research process is designed to work against one’s biases and prejudices so as to help one grow toward an ever-increasing objectivity. Developing critical thinking skills is crucial to the process for this very reason.
Secondly, apathy does not lead people to research, interest does. There is no such thing as a disinterested researcher. Perhaps researchers can be more or less interested, but something must move the will to desire to do research—even if it is imposed on them from a teacher as a dreaded assignment! The most crucial part in the research process is determining a topic for research. There are many guidelines for how to go about this, but the point I want to emphasize is this: contrary to popular belief, the heart as well as the head can drive good research.[7] The more passion I have for a topic, the easier it is to discipline myself to study hard and leave no stones unturned. Furthermore, my choice of subject matter can determine how practical and helpful the research report will be to me and to others. The judgment will inevitably involve some level of subjectivity, for different things are more important to different people, and the same things are important to a greater or lesser degree to the same people at different times.
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The Importance of Research For My Own Studies and Vocation
If research did nothing else than provide the researcher with a greater agility with words, a broader vocabulary to draw from in her everyday speech, and a more confident tone of voice in her everyday interactions with people, this would be of weighty significance. Yet this is precisely the sort of personal development I have found to be the result of research in my own life. The constant grind of academia—reading books and articles, writing out one’s thoughts, questioning and answering questions—has the potential to rapidly develop one’s ability to communicate. This has immeasurable relational (as well as vocational) benefits.
For example, when I used to have disagreements with friends over religious topics, the discussion would always escalate into an intense debate that put significant strain on our friendship (at least for the moment). I did not know how to handle the skeptical criticisms of friends who questioned the direction of my life into Christian ministry and my religious beliefs. After exposing myself to a wide variety of philosophical and theological opinions, observing how authors of books and articles kindly and eloquently disagreed with each other, and reading books that helped me better understand my own faith tradition, I found myself not only able to have discussions on religious and ethical topics without getting tongue tied or without causing a tense debate, but even able to impress those with whom I disagreed by how I could articulate their own thoughts with more force and clarity than they themselves could (before explaining why I disagreed with the same sort of force and clarity).
Research and writing fosters healthier written and verbal communication between human beings—and this can have benefits for vocational goals. I have an edge in public speaking—whether a Bible study, preaching, or teaching—because I have plenty to say and craft my words more carefully. Being able to articulate myself has resulted in greater success in vocational tasks (e.g. trying to counsel teenagers who have no guidance and are struggling with all sorts of life issues, making sure I understand my supervisor’s intentions by asking key questions, communicating the vision of my ministry to those who support it financially, etc). Because communication fosters better relationships, research and writing better prepare me for my vocational goals. This would be true regardless of my vocational calling, but is especially true in vocational callings that require high degrees of personal interaction and public speaking (i.e. Christian ministry and education). In a teaching vocation, such articulation is the life-blood of one’s daily affairs.
Research and writing not only help me to better articulate myself, but they force me to inform my opinions and become aware of the strongest arguments against my own convictions. This can be a grueling process that humbles the intellect. It can be a disorienting thing too, if one comes to realize that the persuasive arguments and rhetoric she inherited from her tradition to defend her beliefs simply cannot stand the test of evidence and counter-critique. It fosters humility on the one hand, and respect and appreciation for those with whom one disagrees on the other hand. It is important for people in a vocation of Christian ministry to understand and appreciate those within their own faith tradition who disagree with one another about how they understand the Bible and practical questions of church life. Pastors should have well reasoned arguments in support of their ethical and spiritual teaching that makes sense within that faith tradition. For a teaching vocation, having one’s opinions well informed is simply the default expectation. For my vocational goals, then, the habit of reading arguments for opinions you disagree with is vital.
Whether I am serving as a Christian minister or a teacher (and Christian ministry most often involves teaching), I will be bombarded with questions. The more research and writing I have done in my field, the more likely I will be to answer those questions in a way that satisfies the questioner. After doing so much study and research, I may know of several books that treat the very topics church members or students are interested in. I may not always have the answers to all of the questions students or church members might ask, but after having acquired the skill of research, I may be able to either point the questioner to a helpful book or research the question myself and e-mail the questioner a response to their question. In short, I will be able to better minister and teach.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica, 5 vols. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. New York: Benzinger Bros., 1948; reprint, Notre Dame, Indiana: Ave Maria Press, 1981.
Turabian, Kate. L. A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 7th ed. Revised by Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, Joseph M. Williams, and the University of Chicago Press Editorial Staff. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008.
Vyhmeister, Nancy Jean. Your Guide to Writing Quality Research Papers: For Students of Religion and Theology, 2nd ed. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2008.
[1] ST I-II.27.2
[2] I was answering questions like this: Should I follow through with my engagement to a woman who is not a Christian? Is it wrong for us to be sexually active outside of a marital context? Should I continue deep friendships with friends who influence me to continue in drug abuse and criminal activity? What church should I join (Catholic, Presbyterian, Lutheran, Reformed, Baptist, Methodist)? What should I say to Mormon’s who knock at my door? Should I only listen to Christian music? What can I do to grow in my love for God and for others? What school should I attend? What should I choose for my college major? Is drinking alcohol wrong? Is it still acceptable for me to hang out at nightclubs as a Christian? Is it wrong to be angry with those who try to hurt me? Does being a Christian mean that I cannot defend myself when physically attacked?
[3] For example, Turabian’s manual considers the mundane task of “finding a plumber” research. Kate L. Turabian, A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations, 7th ed., rev. Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, Joseph M. Williams, and the University of Chicago Press Editorial Staff (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 5.
[4] The goal of objectivity makes intelligible the various ways of defining research. For example, Vyhmeister defines research as a “systematic search for adequate information to reach objective knowledge of a specific topic.” It includes “careful investigation of all evidence.” Nancy Jean Vyhmeister, Your Guide to Writing Quality Research Papers: For Students of Religion and Theology, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), 1.
[5] This is why research is not simply “rewriting other people’s words and ideas into a neat description.” Vyhmeister, Your Guide, 5.
[6] In this respect, I find Vyhermeister’s way of explaining research a bit naïve. Does all research result in “objective knowledge”? The claim needs a great deal of clarification. Can one always be aware of their presuppositions as to neatly list them in their introductions? The very nature of some presuppositions escape our notice and others would be too mundane to list. Deciding how to list one’s presuppositions is not as easy as she makes it seem. For example, she presumes a great deal in her own book without listing them in her introduction. Why is this? Do researchers really have to steer clear of defending their own convictions and opinions? This seems impossible. Vyhmeister, Your Guide, 1,3,6. Turabian’s way of explaining research works much better. “That is how a research report differs from other kinds of persuasive writing: it must rest on shared facts that readers accept as truths independent of your feelings and beliefs.” Turabian, A Manual for Writers, 6. This does not say whether these “shared facts” are true or false, only that they are “shared” and thus provide the grounds for persuasive writing.
[7] Cf. Vyhmeister, Your Guide, 2: “Research is done with the head and not the heart.” The goal of objectivity does not, as she appears to think, rule out passion from the research process or the writing process.
Freedom for Excellence: Pinckaers Alternative to “Ockham’s Other Razor”
In our last post we looked at Pinckaers criticisms of Ockham’s Other Razor (i.e. William of Ockham’s notion of free will), which he calls “freedom of indifference.” This post is Pinckaers description of what he thinks is a more accurate notion of human freedom: freedom for excellence.
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Pinckaers, Servais, O.P. The Sources of Christian Ethics, Translated by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995.

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Freedom for Excellence
Freedom for excellence is first illustrated as akin to a child learning to play the piano. She must have some predispositions to learn—an attraction to music and an “ear for it” (354). In this case, her predispositions enable her to develop the freedom to play beautifully after much discipline (355). Progress is developed by regular exercise, or, a habitus (355). The ability, in the end, to play with ease, compose new music, and delight oneself and all who hear, is the stage of maturity corresponding to freedom (355). Similarly, the virtue of courage is “acquired far more through small victories of self-conquest, repeated day after day, than through dreams of great actions” (356). The author briefly mentions what he calls “the internal harmony of the virtues”—“true courage is worth little without wise discernment as to what should be done, and without self-control, justice, and generosity” (357). A notion of freedom in this framework places predispositions and natural inclinations in service of freedom (rather than opposed to it, as with Ockham’s Other Razor), in fact enabling it (357).
The root of freedom is twofold: 1) a sense of the true and good and 2) a desire for knowledge and happiness (357). These are the semina virtutum (the seeds of virtue). Our natures are inclined to sense the virtues and give spontaneious praise to them, and this is the sequi naturam (follow nature) principle of the ancients and what St. Thomas calls the instinctus rationis (rational instinct). “Far from lessening our freedom, such dispositions are its foundation. We are free, not in spite of them, but because of them” (358).
The Stages of Development
Freedom for excellence “requires the slow, patient work of moral education in order to develop” (359). The author takes us through these stages as he sees them.
Childhood corresponds to what we shall call the stage of discipline, adolescence to the stage of progress, and adulthood to the stage of maturity or the perfection of freedom. (italics added, 359)
The first stage is a delicate affair in which the moral educator must be neither authoritarian nor libertarian, but somewhere in between, making sure the “child” understands that the “discipline, law, and rules are not meant to destroy his freedom … Their purpose is rather to develop his ability to perform actions of real excellence by removing dangerous excesses” that “jeopardize his interior freedom” (360). The student must experience the love of his teacher and the love of God (362). This discipline “appeals to natural dispositions, to a spontaneous sense of truth and goodness, and to the conscience” (360).
The key characteristic of the next stage, the stage of progress is “taking one’s own moral life in hand, by a predominance of initiative and personal effort, by the development of and appreciation and taste for moral quality, and the deepening of an active interiority” (363). In is in this stage that the virtues begin to form and take shape and the “adolescent” begins to find joy in the virtues themselves and develops strong dispositions for action (363).
The final stage is that of maturity (or “perfection” in the human sense of “complete,” 366). This includes mastery of excellent actions and creative fruitfulness (366). In this stage charity is “perfected” or matured such that the persons “chief concern is to be united to God and to find all their joy in him” (368). Yet this joy passes from God to others so as to make their virtue beneficial for the community (367). Pinckaers clarifies that this description in “stages” does not necessarily mean that in experience the process is perfectly “linear,” but involves a “certain dialectic” (372). Also, one should not get the idea that once “maturity” or “perfection” is reached there is no room for growth (373).
Compared with Freedom of Indifference
Compared with the “delicate” process of moral education here, the “theory of freedom of indifference robs discipline and education of the profound, intimate rootedness they require. Education becomes a battle; it can no longer be service or collaboration” (360). Pinckaers attributes the cut-off point in moral education after only the first stage to the position found in the freedom of indifference (362). Whereas freedom to do evil is essential in freedom of indifference, it is a lack of freedom in this model (376). The reduced role of Scripture is also to be blamed on Ockham’s freedom of indifference (377). Pinckaers concludes that freedom for excellence offers “a far better foundation for receiving revelation and grace, particularly through freedom’s natural openness to the true and the good” (377).
Ockham’s Other Razor: Pinckaers Account of Ockham’s Notion of Free Will
The following is the first of two posts dealing with Servais Pinckaers account of two different conceptions of human freedom: freedom for excellence vs. freedom of indifference. Pinckaers thinks that the notion of “freedom of indifference” is bogus, and that the more classical view of free will, freedom for excellence, is much better. NOTE: Ockham’s Other Razor is my label, and does not occur in Pinckaers.
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Pinckaers, Servais, O.P. The Sources of Christian Ethics, Translated by Sr. Mary Thomas Noble, O.P. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995.
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Freedom for Excellence vs. Freedom of Indifference
Moral theories characteristic of the patristic age and the great scholastic periods were dominated by questions of human happiness and the virtues and conceived of human freedom as freedom for excellence. Modern moral theories are predominated by notions of obligation and commandments and assume a notion of human freedom called freedom of indifference (329).
St. Thomas explained freedom as a faculty proceeding from reason and will, which unite to make the act of choice. … For him, free will was not a prime or originating faculty; it presupposed intelligence and will. It was rooted, therefore, in the inclinations to truth and goodness that constituted these faculties (331).
Ockham, on the contrary, maintained that free will preceded reason and will in such a way as to move them to their acts. ‘For I can freely choose,’ he said, ‘to know or not to know, to will or not to will.’ For him, free will was the prime faculty, anterior to intelligence and will as well as to their acts. (331).
Ockham’s Other Razor: Pinckaers’s Short Narrative of Moral Theory
Pinckaers is partial to Thomistic moral theory and assumes that freedom for excellence is much richer a concept for moral theory than notions of freedom of indifference (329). His disdain for moral theories based on the notion of freedom from indifference is not intended to be subtle in his account of its origins and contours. Pejorative language pervades his description of what he thinks the notion of freedom of indifference causes in moral theory—a “destruction” of the harmony between humanity and nature (333), a “banishing” of considerations of human nature and spiritual spontaneity (333), a “rupturing” of the human soul (335), “the upheaval of all moral ideas and their systematic organization” (335), a “shattering” of the beautiful Thomistic order (337), a “disruption” of the field of moral theory that yields bizarre and uncoordinated contours of human action (338).
The chapter’s basic narrative goes something like this: Moral theories were getting along wonderfully with a rich and orderly account of human nature and morality (based on Aristotle and the Fathers but expressed perhaps most fully in St. Thomas) when Ockham came along and tampered with the notion of human freedom in a way that ruptured the unity and coherency of moral theory and led to unnecessary disjunctions and false dichotomies. Ockham’s view of human freedom was like a germ that infected every aspect of moral theory, completely restructuring it and redefining all its parts. Moral theories have been infected with this disease ever since.
Although perhaps less known, this was Ockham’s Other Razor—the one that took the harmonized parts of the beautiful Thomistic synthesis between human nature and morality and cut them up into disjointed pieces. By Pinckaers’s judgment, Ockham’s Other Razor slit the throat of Thomas’ brilliant synthesis, bleeding the life out of dynamic moral theory.
Pinckaers’s Fuller Account of Ockham’s Other Razor
In Ockham’s view of human freedom, although many things can potentially influence the will, nothing can be allowed to determine the will outside itself—not human reason, not God’s will, or human emotions/desires/passions (331). Thus, it has to have the ability to choose to do what is contrary to reason, God’s will, and human passions. So, for example, it can choose to be happy or not be happy. This will is the ultimate self because even if one aspect of “the self” desires something with great passion, the will has to have the power to say “No!” This freedom was thought to be at the very core of human nature—the very “being” of a person (332). Pinckaers concludes that “this is doubtless the origin of the divorce between moral theory and the desire for happiness, which has been effected in our times” (333).
It is called freedom of indifference not because the human will cannot be influenced by something other than itself, but that it always must retain enough “indifference” (or autonomy) to never be determined by such outside influences, for if it is determined by anything outside itself, it is not ultimately “free.” In fact, “it even seemed that freedom could find no better way of asserting itself than to struggle against” human sensibilities, habits, passions, etc. (335). Only one passion can be considered primitive to man—his passion to self-affirmation, “to the assertion of a radical difference between itself and all else” (338).
No past action can determine any future action; all human action occurs in “isolated succession” such that personality, Pinckaers argues, becomes unintelligible (336-37). Pinckaers complains: “Human discontinuity is one of the basic tenets of Ockham’s psychology” (338). In this view of human freedom, anything that one might conceive of as being able to have a great deal of influence over the will is set against it (loyalty, reason, natural inclinations, desires, God will)—they become a threat to human freedom (340). This also effects the doctrine of God. The moral will is capricious because God is absolutely free—it cannot be derived from the nature of things (342). Since God’s will is revealed in the human conscience, moral theory can be worked out apart from an account of God (349). Reason’s imperatives, however, are irrational (they are not grounded in the nature of things or in the nature of God, 348).
Conclusion
A litany of accusations is leveled throughout Pinckaers’s account of Ockham’s view of human freedom that the reader must carefully consider. It is the “origin of the divorce between moral theory and the desire for happiness” (333); it demands human action occur in “isolated succession,” and thus makes what we call “personality” ultimately unintelligible (336-37); it sets God’s will over against the human will as one higher capricious will against a lower capricious will (342); it makes God’s will irrational because it is not based on the nature of things or on the nature of God himself (348); it creates all sorts of unnecessary dichotomies between freedom and law, freedom and grace, subject and object, etc. (350). There is much overlap between Pinckaers’ critique of freedom of indifference and the more extensive critique leveled by American theologian Jonathan Edwards.
The next post will explore what Pinckaers offers as an alternative to Ockham’s notion of freedom: freedom for excellence.
Blogshot __–___–_______–10.17.10
1. Bryan Cross from Called to Communion: Reformation Meets Rome posted a piece written by David Anders about how John Calvin led him to Catholicism. Interesting and ironic piece.
2. That reminds me. In case you missed it, a big leader in the Anglican Church just converted to Rome. Read about the splash here.
3. Ever wondered how Catholics view The Great Schism? For an interesting and informative historical survey of this Schism by Devin Rose, subscribe to his podcast: Catholic Apologetics and Faith Formation Podcast. He also has very interesting lectures about The Ecumenical Councils, The Papacy, Marian Dogmas, etc. He is a great lecturer and engages with classic Protestant arguments and concerns.
4. Ever wondered how close Eastern Orthodoxy is to Evangelical Christianity? Listening to Bradley Nassif’s Podcast, Simply Orthodox, has convinced me that they are closer than one might think.
5. The most interesting podcast I’ve listened to in a long time was a podcast at The Carnegie Council by Gregory Raymond: After Iraq. He draws comparisons between Ancient Greece and Persian Warfare ideology and modern American Warfare ideology. It was so interesting I went back and listened to it about 4 times in the past year.
6. A little chat about different strands of evangelicalism. I thought Owen Strachan had some particularly weighty comments.
7. For some good laughs:


